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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Defendant STEVEN D CALDWELL and the Plaintiff 
LAUREL W CALDWELL, formerly husband and wife, were 
divorced in 1983. The 1983 Decree of Divorce provided 
i 
that the Defendant was to pay a portion of a then-
outstanding mortgage indebtedness in favor of "Hal E 
Wall", who was (is) the father of Plaintiff LAUREL W 
CALDWELL. The Plaintiff NELDA F WALL is the surviving 
spouse of Hal E Wall and is the mother of Plaintiff 
LAUREL W CALDWELL. No cross appeal was taken by 
Plaintiff LAUREL W CALDWELL from the Order setting 
aside the 1993 judgment awarded to her. Thus, although 
she is a party to the original action, she [LAUREL 
CALDWELL] may not be a party to this appeal, in that 
the "judgment" which is the subject of this appeal only 
applies to Plaintiff NELDA F WALL. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to 
the provision of Section 78-2a-3(2) (j), Utah Code, and 
the "pour over" Order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated 
as of 8 April 1997, transferring this case to the Court 
of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issues: 
1. That the entered default judgment is void 
because of lack of personal service upon the 
Defendant. 
2. Whether a "default judgment" can be 
entered based upon "vicarious service" 
effected upon the spouse of the defendant, 
when in fact and when counsel for the 
plaintiff has reason to believe that the 
defendant is not regularly residing at that 
location and the "wife's" home is not the 
"usual place of abode" of the defendant at the 
time of service. 
3. Whether a provision contained within a 
divorce decree pertaining to the payment of a 
then-outstanding mortgage indebtedness 
constitutes a "judgment", subject to "renewal" 
(through a new, independent action) brought by 
4 
a party who is a stranger to that original 
divorce action. 
4. Whether a person not legally appointed 
as the "personal representative" or "special 
administrator" of a deceased person may 
bring an action "in behalf of the estate" of 
such deceased person. 
5. Whether a default judgment may be entered 
when it is materially different from the 
original complaint allegedly "served" upon the 
defendant. 
6. Whether, as a matter of law, the "default 
judgment" (and the original complaint) were so 
facially-flawed for the reasons identified 
in subparagraphs 3, 5 and 5, above, herein 
that the District Court would be prevented 
from entering said judgment, and, having done 
so, abused its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the judgment, when those fatal flaws 
were so identified to the Court. 
7. Whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the Nelda 
Wall "judgment". 
Ordinarily, the "standard of review" for the appellate 
court in examining the trial court's refusal to set 
5 
aside a previously-entered "default judgment" is an 
"abuse of discretion" inquiry. See Larsen v Collins, 
684 P.2d 52 (Utah Supreme Court 1984). However, the 
trial court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment 
which would be void because of lack of personal service 
upon the defendant; the trial court has no discretion 
to refuse to set such a judgment aside. See Woody vs 
Rhodes, 461 P.2d 465 (Utah Supreme Court 1969); 
Garcia vs Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288 (Utah Supreme Court 
1988). Thus, for that issue and the remaining issues, 
the standard of review is a "correction of error" 
standard, in which the Court of Appeals gives the trial 
court no particular deference in its legal analysis and 
conclusions. See generally Aragon vs Clover Club Foods 
Company, 857 P.2d 250 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993); 
Rollins v Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah Supreme Court 
1992) . 
The foregoing issues were raised to the District 
Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
the Default Judgment. Record at pp. 3 7-46. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant STEVEN D CALDWELL and the Plaintiff 
LAUREL w CALDWELL, formerly husband and wife, were 
divorced in 1983. The 1983 Decree of Divorce provided 
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that the Defendant was to pay a portion of a then-
outstanding mortgage indebtedness in favor of "Hal E 
Wall", who was (is) the father of Plaintiff LAUREL W 
CALDWELL. The Plaintiff NELDA J WALL is the surviving 
spouse of Hal E Wall and is the mother of Plaintiff 
LAUREL W CALDWELL. [No cross appeal was taken by 
Plaintiff LAUREL W CALDWELL from the Order setting 
aside the 1993 judgment awarded to her. Thus, although 
she is a party to the original action, she may not be 
a party to this appeal, in that the "judgment" which is 
the subject of the appeal only applies to Plaintiff 
NELDA J WALL.] 
In December 1990 literally within a week of when 
the 8-year statute of limitation (per §78-12-22, UC) 
for "renewal" of judgments (assumed, by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, to be applicable to the 1983 divorce decree) 
would otherwise expire the Plaintiff LAUREL CALDWELL 
and Plaintiff-Appellee NELDA WALL filed an action, 
purporting to "renew" the "judgment" (i.e. the 1983 
divorce decree provisions, although not so specifically 
denominated as such in the Plaintiff's complaint) to 
collect from the Defendant his portion of the "Hal E 
Wall" mortgage indebtedness. The "renewal" action was 
not filed as part of the original divorce proceeding, 
but was an independent action in a new filing. Because 
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the Defendant was not served in a timely manner, the 
action was dismissed by the district court in June 
1991. [See generally Transcript of 3 October 1996 
garnishment hearing, pp. 6-7; Record at pp. 2 05-206] 
In June 1992 exactly one year from the date of 
the former dismissal Plaintiff LAUREL CALDWELL and 
Plaintiff-Appellee NELDA WALL filed a second action, 
again seeking to "renew" the "judgment" against the 
Defendant. The claim of Plaintiff NELDA J WALL 
pertained to the "Hal E Wall" mortgage. The terse (one 
and one-half page) Complaint did not assert that the 
"mortgage" claim was brought by LAUREL CALDWELL; rather 
it asserted judgment was sought "in favor of the Estate 
of Hal E Wall". [Record at pp. 1-2; see APPENDIX A] 
At that time the Defendant resided outside of the 
State of Utah: in Amarillo, Texas. [See Affidavit of 
Steven D Caldwell. Record at p. 31] His wife Nikki 
Caldwell, however, resided in Missouri. [That the 
Defendant was not regularly residing in Missouri at the 
time was known to Plaintiff's counsel.] In the very 
last week before the 120-day period for service of the 
summons and complaint in the new case this action 
would expire, Plaintiff's counsel caused the summons 
and complaint to be served upon "Nikki Caldwell" the 
wife of the Defendant at HER residence in Missouri, 
8 
through a Missouri deputy sheriff. The Defendant filed 
an Affidavit averring he did not receive the summons 
and complaint. [Because the service upon the spouse, 
but not upon the Defendant personally was effected 
barely within the 120-day period provided by the Rules, 
a second opportunity to effect actual "personal 
service" upon him could not be made: Plaintiff's 
counsel having waited until the last possible minute-
--had to go with what came back from Missouri: that 
"Nikki" not Steven was served.] 
I In February 1993 a "default judgment" was entered 
against the Defendant based upon the Missouri deputy 
sheriff's "return" indicating that the service had been 
made upon "Nikki Caldwell". Record at pp. 13-14. 
The actual "judgment" signed by the District Court 
experienced a significant evolution. The original cause 
of action was pleaded by "Nelda Wall on behalf of the 
estate of Hal E Wall"; by the time the judgment was 
prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel, the judgment was 
worded to be "in favor of Nelda Wall", with all 
references to the "estate of Hal E Wall" having been 
deleted. [Hal E Wall died in 1990. His estate was NOT 
probated. Nelda Wall was NOT appointed the Personal 
Representative or Special Administrator of his estate. 
[See Affidavit of Hal Ruekert. Record at pp. 88-89] 
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This fact should have been obvious from the face of the 
pleading (complaint) and/or the District Court's 
"judicial notice" of its own files. Hal Wall was a 
resident of Salt Lake County at the time of his death.] 
In September 1996 the Defendant became aware that 
the 1993 default judgment had been entered against him 
when a writ of garnishment was served upon his 
employer. He promptly filed a motion to stay the 
garnishment proceedings and to set aside the default 
judgment under Rule 6 0(b) . [Record at pp. 3 7 thru 4 6.] 
Hearings were held before the District Court on October 
4, 1996 [concerning the stay of the garnishment 
proceedings, pending resolution of the Defendant's 
motion to set aside the default judgment] and on 
December 13, 1996 [concerning the merits of the 
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment]. 
At the December 13th hearing the District: Court 
agreed to set aside the default judgment entered in 
favor of Plaintiff LAUREL CALDWELL (for delinquent 
child support), but refused to set aside the judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee NELDA WALL. [Transcript 
of 13 December 1996 hearing at p. 16; Record at p. 227] 
Defendant filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. 
On February 6, 1997, the District Court signed and 
entered an Order, confirming its earlier announced 
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ruling regarding the default judgment in favor of NELDA 
WALL. [Record at 175-175.] 
This appeal was timely filed and perfected. On 8 
April 1997 the Utah Supreme Court exercised its 
jurisdiction to "pour over" the case to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant-Appellants arguments are summarized: 
1. The judgment entered against the 
Defendant is void because of the lack of 
personal service upon him. Service of the 
summons and complaint at the home where his 
wife was residing (Missouri) is not valid 
service upon him, "at his usual place of 
abode" (Texas) at the time service was 
actually made, per the Lawrence vs Grant 
(1910) decision. 
2. Principles of equity and fairness dictate 
that the default judgment be set aside so that 
the Defendant not having been validly served 
and not appearing at all in the proceeding 
can have his "day in court" to challenge the 
claims brought against him. The inconvenience 
and burden upon the Plaintiffs already 
having waited several years is relatively 
minimal on the simplistic claims made. 
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3. The trial court erred in entering default 
judgment when the complaint was so facially 
flawed. The "mortgage" provision from the 1983 
Divorce Decree was not a "judgment" at all, 
capable of "renewal", particularly in favor of 
Plaintiff NELDA F WALL who is a stranger to 
that original divorce action and was not a 
party to the original divorce "judgment". 
Furthermore, Plaintiff NELDA F WALL could not 
in her own personal capacity bring an action 
"in behalf of the estate" of a deceased 
person, unless she was legally authorized to 
do so pursuant to order of a probate 
proceeding. 
4. The trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to set aside the default judgment in 
favor of NELDA WALL (on the "mortgage" claim) , 
while at the same time setting aside the 
default judgment awarded to LAUREL CALDWELL, 
who was THE PARTY to the original divorce and 
who possessed any rights under that 
"j udgment". 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS VOID 
BECAUSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL SERVICE 
UPON THE DEFENDANT 
12 
Proper service of process IS JURISDICTIONAL to the 
case! Without valid service, the court has NO 
JURISDICTION over the defendant and cannot enter a 
valid judgment. A default judgment entered upon the 
non-appearance of an invalidly-served defendant is 
VOID! 
At the trial court below, the Plaintiffs asserted 
and were able to convince the District Court that the 
Plaintiffs are (were) required to exercise only 
"reasonable diligence and good faith" and that they 
used "reasonable means" to find and serve the 
I 
Defendant. [If the Plaintiffs were unsure of the 
Defendant's out-of-state whereabouts, they arguably 
could have sought service "by publication"; they didn't 
attempt this method.] "Reasonable diligence", "good 
faith" and/or "reasonable means" are neither the legal 
standard nor the procedure by which a court obtains 
jurisdiction over a defendant! 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in relevant part: 
(e) Personal service shall be made as 
follows: 
(1) . . . or by leaving a copy at 
the individual's dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing, . . . 
Emphasis added. 
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In Garcia vs Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288 (Utah 1986) , the 
defendant was imprisoned in the Utah State Prison. 
Personal service of the summons and complaint was NOT 
effected upon him; instead, the summons was served upon 
an employee of the prison. The Supreme Court found the 
service to be not in compliance with Rule 4 and ordered 
the default judgment set aside! The Court wrote: 
. . . the attempted service on appellant was 
fatally defective. There being no effective 
service of process, the court was without 
jurisdiction to enter the original decree of 
divorce. 
. . . where the judgment is void because of a 
fatally defective service of process, the time 
limitations of Rule 60(b) have no application. 
Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249, 461 P.2d 465 
(1969). 
This is consistent with holdings under the 
Federal Rules, after which our Rules were 
patterned. As noted in Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure . . .: 
Rule 60(b) (4) [the equivalent to 
Utah Rule 60(b)(5)] authorizes 
relief from void judgments. 
Necessarily a motion under this part 
of the rule differs markedly from 
motions under the other clauses of 
Rule 60(b) . There is no question of 
discretion on the part of the court 
when a motion is under Rule 
60(b) (4) . Nor is there any 
requirement, as there usually is 
when default judgments are attacked 
under Rule 60(b), that the moving 
party show that he has a meritorious 
defense. Either a judgment is void 
or it is valid* Determining which 
it is may well present a difficult 
question, but when that question is 
resolved, the court must act 
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accordingly. 
By the same token, there is no time 
limit on an attack on a judgment as 
void. The one-year [three-month, in 
Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 
60(b) motions is expressly 
inapplicable, and even the 
requirement that the motion be made 
within a "reasonable time, ,f which 
seems literally to apply to motions 
under Rule 60(b)(4), cannot be 
enforced with regard to this class 
of motion. A void judgment cannot 
acquire validity because of laches 
on the part of the judgment debtor. 
Because we have concluded that the trial court 
had no jurisdiction to enter the divorce 
decree in the first instance, the order 
denying relief from judgment must be, and is, 
reversed. The case is remanded for entry of 
judgment vacating the decree of divorce 
because of the ineffective service of process. 
In view of our holding that the decree is void 
for lack of jurisdiction, we need not address 
points raised in the petition for 
modification. 
Id. at . Footnotes omitted. All emphasis added. 
In Woody vs Rhodes, 461 P. 2d 465 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1969), affirming the setting aside of the default 
judgment, the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
The service of summons being fatally 
defective, the judgment entered thereto is 
without force or effect and the court acted 
properly in setting it aside. The three-months 
provision provided for in Rule 60(b) has no 
application to this situation. 
461 P.2d at . Emphasis added. 
In Grant vs Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 Pac. 931 
(1910), the Utah Supreme Court had opportunity to 
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examine the phrase "usual place of abode" within the 
statute predecessor to Rule 4 governing service of 
process. The Court wrote: 
Usual place of abode is sometimes referred to 
as being synonymous with domicile or permanent 
residence. In our judgment there is a broad 
distinction between domicile and usual place 
of abode as the latter term is used in our 
statute. . . . That is, where a person lives--
-abides at the particular time when the 
summons is served, constitutes his usual place 
of abode. 
108 Pac. at 933. Emphasis added. 
The Utah Supreme Court quoted the New Jersey 
Supreme Court: 
The statute does not direct service to be made 
at the Residence7 of the defendant, but at 
his dwelling house or usual place of abode, 
which is a much more restricted term. As was 
said in Stout v. Leonard, 37 N.J. Law, 492, 
many persons have several residences which 
they permanently maintain, occupying one at 
one period of the year and another at another 
period. Where such conditions exist, a summons 
must be served at the dwelling house in which 
the defendant is living at the time where the 
service is made." That is, where a person 
lives--abides--at the particular time when the 
summons is served, constitutes his usual place 
of abode. 
Id at 933. Emphasis added. Finally, referring to a 
United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the 
phrase "usual place of abode", the Court wrote: 
. . . where service of summons is required to 
be made at the "usual place of abode," such 
service, in order to constitute legal service, 
must be made at the defendant's "then present 
residence. " In other words, at the place where 
the defendant then lives or abides. 
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Id. at 933. Emphasis added. 
The Defendant submitted to the trial court an 
affidavit [Record at pp. 31-32] averring the Missouri 
address was NOT his "usual place of abode" at the time 
the summons was served upon Nikki. The Plaintiffs did 
not successfully counter that affidavit. [That the 
Appleton, Missouri address is NOT the Defendant's 
"usual place of abode" is further evidenced by the fact 
that the service was made upon Nikki not upon the 
Defendant at that time!] 
The default judgment entered upon the service of 
process upon the defendant's wife at the Appleton, 
Missouri address which WAS NOT the Defendant's "usual 
place of abode at the time of such service of process"-
--is void and must be set aside. 
The Missouri address at which the summons was 
delivered was NOT the Defendant's "dwelling house or 
usual place of abode". This fact was implicitly 
acknowledged by Plaintiff's counsel in his 15 September 
1992 letter to the Missouri sheriff, in which he states 
that the Defendant can be found at that address only on 
weekends. [See RECORD at p. 73. A photocopy of this 
letter is attached hereto as APPENDIX C ] Mr Findlay 
wrote: 
Mr. Caldwell is working out of town and can 
only be found at home on weekends. 
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[Record at p. 73. See APPENDIX D.] Emphasis added. 
September 28, 1992 was a MONDAY! The summons was served 
at 3:09 p.m. on Nikki. The Defendant did NOT receive 
the summons; it was NOT "served" at his "usual place of 
abode". 
Consequently, the Plaintiffs have not complied with 
the requirements of Rule 4 and the "default judgment" 
cannot stand. 
II 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
The Defendant not having been "personally served" 
as Rule 4 requires did not appear to challenge the 
instant proceeding. He became aware thereof only in 
September 1996 when his wages were garnished. It is 
only fair that the default judgment should be set 
aside. The Plaintiffs having waiting eight years to 
initially file the "renewal" action, plus another year 
following the dismissal for failure to serve the 
defendant in a timely manner, plus over three years to 
institute garnishment proceedings cannot be 
prejudiced by the delay which is largely of their own 
choosing! 
In Interstate Excavating, Incorporated vs Agla 
Development Corporation, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that where the defendant did 
not receive notice of trial date from its attorney 
18 
after attorney's withdrawal from case and where, upon 
receipt of notice of default judgment, defendant 
immediately contacted its present counsel who 
thereafter proceeding with diligence to attack the 
default judgment, interests of justice would be best 
served by setting aside the default judgment. The facts 
pertinent to the appeal in Interstate Excavating are 
very similar to the instant case: the party-litigant 
received no notice of the trial date. The Utah Supreme 
Court wrote: 
This is admittedly a perplexing case. 
From the standpoint of the plaintiff and its 
counsel, they appeal to have proceeded without 
any impropriety, including appearing on the 
trial date and presenting their case. 
Defendant counters with the averments that it 
received no such notice. Supportive of the 
defendant's position, are the fact that the 
justification for its default rests upon the 
assertion of service of notice by ordinary 
mail; and that immediately upon learning of 
the judgment, it proceeded diligently with 
efforts to set it aside and contest the issues 
on the merits. 
The uniformly acknowledged policy of the 
law is to accord litigants the opportunity for 
a hearing on the merits, where that can be 
done without serious injustice to the other 
party. To that end, the courts are generally 
indulgent toward setting aside default 
judgments where there is a reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear, and where timely 
application is made to set it aside. 
Consistent with the objective just stated, 
where there is doubt about whether a default 
should be resolved in favor of doing so, to 
the end that each party may have an 
opportunity to present his side of the 
controversy and that there may be a resolution 
19 
in accordance with law and justice. 
611 P.2d at 371. Emphasis added. If, under Interstate 
Excavating, it is error for the trial court to refuse 
to set aside a default judgment entered against a 
party, without counsel, who actually received 
notification of the trial but failed to pay attention 
to that notification [see Chief Justice Hall's 
dissenting opinion], then certainly it is only proper 
for the Court to set aside the default judgment against 
a party who received no notification of the action, 
even if the summons had been delivered to his spouse at 
a residence in which he did not regularly reside. 
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Company vs Paul W 
Larsen Contractor, Incorporated, 544 P. 2d 876 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
the trial court's order dismissing the case was an 
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court wrote: 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases 
with dispatch and to move calendars with 
expedition in order to keep them up to date. 
But it is even more important to keep in mind 
that the very reason for the existence of 
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity 
to be heard and to do justice between them. In 
conformity with that principle the courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief from 
default judgments where there is any 
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in 
substantial prejudice or injustice to the 
adverse party. 
544 P. 2d at 879. Emphasis added. Citations in footnotes 
20 
omitted. 
The Defendant has pleaded meritorious defenses. 
[The proffered Answer is included at the Record at pp. 
63-69.] The default judgment should be set aside. The 
Defendant first becoming aware of the default 
judgment when the garnishment was served upon his 
employer has made timely and consistent efforts to 
resolve this issue. He has complied with the 
requirements of Rule 60(b) to set the default judgment 
aside. 
The prejudice to the Defendant is substantial: a 
judgment in the face value of in excess of $30,000 
stands, when he has been deprived of "its day in 
court". On the other hand, the prejudice to the 
Plaintiff is minimal. Furthermore, the delay in the 
parties in her attempt to collect on the judgment 
further evidences that minimal prejudice. 
Ill 
THE COMPLAINT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT 
IS BASED IS FACIALLY DEFECTIVE 
AND CANNOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT 
In Stevens vs Collard, 837 P. 2d 593 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1992), this Court stated: 
A trial court asked to render a judgment by 
default must conclude that the uncontroverted 
allegations of an applicant's petition are, on 
their face, legally sufficient to establish a 
valid claim against the defaulting party. 
837 P.2d at 595. Emphasis added. 
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The Plaintiff NELDA F WALL was NOT the legally 
appointed "personal representative" or "special 
administrator" of "the Estate of Hal Wall" (who died in 
1990) . The Complaint does not even allege that she was! 
As a matter of law, she cannot bring an action "in 
behalf of the Estate of Hal Wall". A well-intentioned 
person even the surviving spouse cannot, absent a 
formal appointment by the probate court bring an 
action "in behalf of the estate" of a deceased person! 
Her facially-defective complaint cannot be allowed to 
support a claim against the defendant. 
Similarly, the "judgment" sought to be renewed is 
not a "judgment" which can be "renewed". This point 
that the provisions from the 1983 divorce decree 
pertaining to the Hal Wall mortgage are not a 
"judgment" capable of "renewal", particularly by Nelda 
Wall, not a party to the original divorce was 
acknowledged by Judge Noel at the October 4th hearing 
on the garnishment! [Transcript of 4 October 1996 
hearing, pp. 5 thru 8; Record at pp. 2 04-208.] 
There are two references in the 1983 Divorce Decree 
[found at Record at pp. 55-59; also included as an 
APPENDIX D, hereto] which have bearing on the "Hal E 
Wall mortgage" obligation, as follows: 
[Paragraph 5]: 
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5. . . . with the express provision that 
defendant shall assume and pay and be totally 
responsible for the remaining balances of the 
second mortgage due Hal E. Wall in the sum of 
$10,069.00 . . . 
[Paragraph 9] : 
9. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
assume and pay the balance due to Hal E. Wall 
on the second mortgage in the sum of 
$10,069.00/ . . . 
[Record at p. 0058. See APPENDIX D, herein] 
Those provisions are in favor of LAUREL CALDWELL, 
not Hal E Wall! Those provisions (from the 1983 Decree) 
cannot be construed to be a "judgment" in favor of Hal 
E. Wall/ Hal E. Wall was not a party to the 1983 
divorce. Thus, the instant proceeding purporting to 
"renew" that "judgment" is flawed and facially 
defective ab initio. 
If that portion of the 1993 judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff LAUREL CALDWELL (for delinquent child 
support) was set aside (ostensibly on res judicata 
grounds) by the District Court, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to refuse to set aside 
the NELDA WALL judgment on those same grounds! It is 
totally illogical and almost ironic that the trial 
judge's decision to set aside the judgment entered in 
favor of Laurel Caldwell who WAS a party to the 
original divorce decree and, arguably entitled to 
enforce (or "renew") that judgment and nevertheless 
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leave in place the judgment entered in favor of Nelda 
Wall, who WAS NOT a party (to the original divorce) 
and, consequently, cannot be entitled to "renew" the 
earlier judgment. 
And it is similarly an "abuse of discretion" for 
the trial court to have refused to set aside the NELDA 
WALL default judgment on simply grounds of equitable 
fairness. 
IV 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT 
FROM THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT 
AND CANNOT STAND 
The nature of the Plaintiff's claims experienced 
a significant evolution in the course of events. 
Nevertheless, Rule 54(c)(2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, specifies that 
"a judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from . . . that specifically prayed 
for in the demand for judgment." 
The default judgment is materially different firom the 
original complaint allegedly "served" upon the 
Defendant: Paragraph 1 of the "prayer for relief" 
portion of the terse complaint prays for 
"judgment in favor of the Estate of Hal E. 
Wall in the amount of $10,069.00 together with 
post judgment interest in the amount of 
$12,034.24 for a total of $22,103.47. 
[Record at p. 0 02.] Emphasis added. In the February 
1993 "Motion for Entry and Judgment by Default", 
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Defendant living in Texas was NOT personally served 
(vicariously, upon a person "residing at his usual 
place of abode" at the time service was effected) . The 
judgment is void! 
The default judgment should be set aside and the 
defendant should be allowed to defend thereon. It was 
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to set aside 
the LAUREL W CALDWELL portion of the judgment and 
refuse to set aside the NELDA F WALL portion of the 
judgment, for the same (or different) grounds. 
The complaint upon which the judgment was based is 
facially flawed and legally defective. NELDA F WALL was 
not appointed the Personal Representative of the 
deceased Hal E. Wall; consequently, she has no legal 
right or authority to bring an action "in behalf of the 
Estate of Hal E Wall." Similarly, the District Court 
should have been aware that the provision from the 1993 
Divorce Decree was not a "judgment" capable of 
"renewal" (as the complaint purports to do) or that the 
provision was not a "judgment" in favor of Plaintiff 
NELDA F WALL. 
The default judgment entered against the Defendant 
must be set aside and the proceeding dismissed. In the 
alternative, the case should be remanded to the 
District Court so that the Defendant is afforded "his 
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Plaintiffs through counsel stated: 
Judgment may be entered by the clerk of the 
court for the sums certain prayed for in the 
complaint against the defendant and in the 
name of Hal E. Wall or Nelda F. Wall for the 
principal amount . . . 
Record at p. 0011] Emphasis added. By the time the 
"Judgment by Default" document was prepared and signed, 
all references to the "Estate of Hal E Wall" had been 
deleted, both in the caption of the case and in the 
operative text of the judgment, which provided in 
relevant part: 
It is Hereby ORDERED that judgment is granted 
against the defendant Steven D. Caldwell in 
favor of Nelda F. Wall in the Principal amount 
Record at p. 0013. Emphasis added. 
Such a judgment cannot be allowed to stand; it is 
proper for the judgment to be set aside. See Russell vs 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah Supreme Court 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Black-letter law holds that proper service of 
process, in strict compliance with Rule 4, is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid judgment. Woody-
holds that the 3-month limitations of Rule 60(b) do not 
apply to a void judgment entered upon invalid service 
of process. Lawrence holds that the defendant's "usual 
place of abode" is the dwelling where he is living at 
the time of service. The simple fact remains that the 
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day in court". 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of July, 1997 
Attorney for Appellant 
STEVEN D CALDWELL 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be mailed to Mr Delano S Findlay, 
Attorney at Law, 923 East 5350 South, Suite E, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84117, this 9th day of July, 1997. 
.^fegy^T^^fe^^ 
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fc JuN Delano S. Findlay, #1074 Attorney for Plaintiff 923 East 5&9 South, Suite E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 264-8040 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAUREL W. CALDWELL, Personally and 
NELDA WALL on behalf of the ESTATE 
Of HAL E. WALL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEVEN D. CALDWELL, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
cv 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
Civil No, 
Judge: 
Plaintiffs for a cause of action allege: 
1. Plaintiffs reside in Salt Lake County and the original 
causes of action arose in Salt Lake County. 
2. The judgments sought to be renewed are judgments of the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
3. On December 31, 1982, this Court granted a Decree of 
Divorce in which the Court granted a judgment against the 
defendant and in the favor of Hal E. Wall in the sum of 
$10,069.00. 
4. Interest has accrued at the judgment rate of 12 percent 
(12%) per annum and now amounts to $12,034.47. 
5. Hal E. Wall is deceased and Nelda Wall, his spouse 
APPENDIX A 000001 
brings this action on behalf of his estate. 
6. The defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for unpaid 
child support in the amount of $9,640.65 together with interest 
thereon which has become and is a judgment against the defendant 
pursuant to Utah law. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for: 
1. Judgement in favor of the Estate of Hal E. Wall in the 
amount of $10,069.00 together with post judgment interest in the 
amount of $12,034.24 for a total of $22,103.47, 
2. Judgment for unpaid child support in the amount of 
$9,640.65 together with interest thereon in such amount as the 
Court shall determine, and 
3. Judgment for such other amounts as the court shall 
determine is and constitutes a judgment outstanding against the 
defendant and in fav&r of the plaintiffs. 
Dated this ^£^_ day of June, 
000002 
fc>lou 
Delano S. Findlay, #1074 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
923 East 5375 South, Suite E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 264-8040 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAUREL W. CALDWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN D. CALDWELL, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF 
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT 
Civil NO. 92093224 CV 
JUDGE: FRANK G. NOEL 
State of Missouri ) 
ss. 
County of St. Clair) 
On the ) *•>. day of September, 1992, at 3 & I o'clock 
m. , I served the attached Summons and Complaint upon the defendant 
Steven D. Caldwell by leaving copies at his residence,at 611 North 
Maple# Appleton, MO 64724 with 
person of suitable discretion and age. • < ^ ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ l ^ ^ 
(Title) 
Subscribed and sworn to me under penalty of perjury by 
who personally appeared before me and 
displayed proper identification this day of September, 1992 • 
Notary Public, residing in the State 
of Missouri 
My commission expires; 
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DELANO S. FINDLAY 
Attorney At Law 
923 East Executive Park Drive Telephone No. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 (801) 264-8040 
September 15, 1992 
ST. CLAIR COUNTY SHERIFF -
P.O. Box 309 
Osceola, MO 64776 
Re: Caldwell v. Caldwell 
Dear Sheriff: 
Enclosed please find a the original and one copy of a Summons 
and two copies of a Complaint for service upon Steven D. Caldwell 
who resides at 611 North Maple Drive, Appleton, MO 64724. Also 
enclosed to be served with the Summons and Complaint is one copy 
each of a Motion For Default Judgment and affidavit of the 
plaintiff and of counsel. 
Please serve the Summons and Complaint by showing the original 
Summons and leaving the copy of the Summons and one of the Copies 
of the complaint with the defendant Steven D. Caldwell or a person 
of suitable age and discretion at the residence. Please return the 
original of the Summons and the other copy of the Complaint for 
filing with the court. /I understand that Mrs. CaldWell does not 
Work and may be found at home sometime during normal daytime hours. 
Mr. Caldwell is working out of town and can only be found at home 
on weekends. \ 
Please have the officer making the service write his office 
and the date and time of service on the copy of the complaint and 
the Summons left with or for Mr. Caldwell» Please write the same 
information arid' "the identity of the person tflth whom they are left 
at the residence on the copies returned for filing. Enclosed also 
are two affidavits of service; one to be completed and returned 
along with the original of the summons and the other copy of the 
complaint for filing with the court unless you have your own form 
which you wish to use. The other affidavit is to be returned 
showing service of the Motion and affidavits. There is no need to 
return a copy of the Motion or the affidavits so no extra copies 
are included. 
I understand the fee for service is $33.00 regardless of the 
number of documents. A check in that amount is enclosed, if more 
is needed please make the service, but let me know the additional 
amount and I will forward the amount by return mail. 
Service of the Summons and Complaint must be accomplished 
before October 3. 1992. If you have any questions you may 
telephone me at the telephone number in the letterhead collect. 
Thank you for your assistance 
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OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street /) A . _ ^ . . >n ,/) <-"/ 
Midval*. Utah 84047 P< • ' 7 £> NO' /V*/ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAUREL W. CALDWELL, : 
Plaintiff, : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. ; 
STEVEN D. CALDWELL, : Civil No. 1)82-1580 
Defendant . : 
The above-entitled matter having conic on regularly for hearing on 
the 15th day of December, 1982, bet ore this Court, the Honorable Timothy Rex 
Hanson, Judge presiding, plaint ill appearing in person anil by her attorney, 
Nolan J. Olsen, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorney, Richard 
McKeown, and plaintiff and defendant having stipulated in open Court as to ail 
matters, and each party having, in open Court, approved said Stipulation, and 
the Court having approved said St i pu I ai i <>n and the defendant having withdrawn 
his Answer and Counterclaim and the delault of the delendant having been 
entered, and plaintiff having been sworn and testified concerning the allega-
tions of her Complaint, and the Court having been fully advised in the premiscsl 
and.the Court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of Nolan J. Olsen, attorney for plaintiff, 
TT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
plaintiff, LAUREL W. CALDWELL, and r lit- defendant, STEVEN D. CALDWELL, be, and 
the same are hereby dissolved, providing, however, that the Decree shall not 
become final until December Jl, 1982, during which time neither of the parties 
hereto shall remarry, which Decree will become final without further notice 
or proceedings, unless either of the parties hereto or the Court, on its own 
motion, shall institute further proceedings herein. 
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2. Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the care, custody and I 
control of five (5) of the minor children of the parties, to wit: Jason 
Caldwell, born January 26, 1%8; Jeremy Caldwell, born August 6, 1970; Jessica 
Caldwell, born March 28, I97r>; Joshua Caldwell, born October 27, 1976; and 
Jina Caldwell, born July 4, 1978, subject to the right of reasonable visitation 
in the defendant, including, but not restricted to the following: 
(a) Each Saturday from 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., with the 
express provision, however, that when defendant obtains suitable 
housing whereby he has adequate facilities for the children to 
stay overnight, and defendant is not unlawfully cohabitating, 
then the defendant shall have said children on Friday evening 
at 6:00 p.m. until Saturday evening at 7:00 p.m., with the 
express provision, however, that on one (1) weekend per month, 
plaintiff shall have the children during the entire weekend. 
(b) Defendant shall have the children on the 24th of I 
December I rom 9:00 a.m. to (>:00 p.m. and for two (2) hours I 
on Christmas U.iy, is may be arranged by the p.ntjes. I 
(c) In addition, defendant shall have visitation with I 
said children on alternating holidays and for two (2) weeks 
during the summer vacation period, if defendant has suitable I 
housing to care for said children and if he is not unlawfully 
cohabitating. I 
(d) In addition, defendant shall have visitation with I 
said children as may be agreeable between the parties. J 
3. Defendant be, and he is hereby awarded the temporary care, 
custody and control of the minor child, Jared Caldwell, born June 7, 1969, said 
custody ro continue until tlio expiration of the present school year, at which 
time said (hi Id, his counselors and plaintiff and defendant shall determine J 
which party shall be awaided the permanent c.ire, custody and control of said J 
child, with the express provision however that plaint ill shall have visitation 
with said child as may be reasonable and a minimum visitation allowed as I 
provided for defendant with the children in the care, custody and control of I 
plaintiff. I 
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[ s u b j e c t to plaintiff assuming and di scliargi ng tin- firsi 
4. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to maintain the minor 
child, Jared Caldwell, in such counseling as may be determined so as to pro-
vide said child with the necessary help for his emotional and mental well being 
5. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the home and real property 
located at 176 West Durdham Lane, Sandy, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
more particularly described as follows: 
ALL OF LOT 44, WALLACE HEICHTS SUBDIVISION 
according to the official plat thereof as 
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder. 
i mortgage due FtrBt 
Security Bank of Utah in the approximate sum at $14,000.00 arid the sum of 
$16,750.00 of the second mortgage due Hal E. Wall and no other liens, with 
the express provision that defendant shall assume and pay and be totally 
responsible for the remaining balances of the second mortgage due Ha. E. Wail 
in the sum of $10,069.00 and any and all United States government, Internal 
Revenue Service liens, aud/or any lien lor taxes due the State of Utah. 
6. Plaintiff be and she is hereby further awarded, as her sole and 
separate property, the furniture, furnishings and fixtures located in the home 
of the parties, the 1972 Pinto automobile and her personal belongings. 
7. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded, as his sole and separate 
property, the 1969 Chevrolet pick-up, two (2) metal military desks, a barbeque 
grill, a pool cue, a wheelbarrow, hi s church and personal papers, as well as an>j 
and all personal belongings. 
8. Plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to assume and discharge 
the first mortgage on the home due First Security Bank of Utah; the sum of 
$16,750.00 on the second mortgage due to Hal E. Wall; the obligations due 
Ironhorse Automotive, with the exception of $200.00 due to Ironhorse to be 
paid by defendant:; as well as any and all debts and obligations incurred In 
her own name since the tiling ol the Complaint herein. 
9. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume and pay the 
balance due to Hal E. Wall on the second mortgage in the sum of $10,069.00; 
11 Federal and State income tax claims which have become due prior to the 
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filing of the Complaint herein, including any and all liens of the United 
States of America Internal Revenue Service or the Strate oL Utah, State Tax 
Commission, which may affect plaintiff's home, it being specifically ordered 
that defendant is totally responsible for said Federal and State taxes. 
10. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume and pay $200.00 
on the Ironhorse Obligation, as well as any and all other debts and obligations! 
he may have incurred in his own name since the filing of the Complaint herein. 
11. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff, for 
the support and maintenance of the minor children in plaintiff's custody, the 
sum of $400.00 per month, said sum to remain at $400.00 per mouth as long as 
plaintiil has at least lour (4) children in hot rare, 'in.tody and control. 
Any decrease below four (4) children shall decrease at the rate of $100.00 
per child per month. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered LO pay said sums 
on the basis of $200.00 on or before the 10th day ot each month and $200.00 on 
or before the 25th day of each month. 
12. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to maintain a medical 
insurance policy on the minor children of the parties, il a medical insurance 
plan is available at his place of employment. He is further ordered to main-
tain any group life insurance policy at his place of employment, naming the 
minor children as beneficiaries thereon. 
13. Piaintiif and defendant are each hereby ordered to assume and 
discharge their individual Court costs and attorneyjs fees. 
DATKD this 7 day of *V~ 
.M ID A; • -T E S T 
H. OJXON HINDLEY 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By ' 
LjWai! 
V* 
•mg*Pg0ft 
Deputy Clwrk 
RICHARD MC KF.OWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
; , Y TH * T THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
Ji^^ iNAL hOCtJMtNT ON FILE IN THE Th HD 
DIS1 niCT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY. STA ... OF 
UTAH. 
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